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Abstract 
Many people find the notion of blending humans and nonhumans together to create animals 
whose brains are composed entirely of human brain cells disturbing. I argue that these moral 
qualms lack adequate justification. I consider a number of reasons for objecting to the creation of 
such chimeras and argue that none of these reasons withstand scrutiny. I argue that the only 
plausible objections to these chimeras would require that they possess morally significant 
properties that would be lacked by similar, non-chimeric animals, but that there is no good 
reason to think this would be the case.  
 
Introduction 
 Among the potentially beneficial uses of human stem cells is the creation of human-
animal chimeras whose brains are composed partly, or perhaps entirely, of human brain cells.1 
Such chimeras facilitate research into a variety of neurophysiological diseases, such as 
Parkinson=s disease, Alzheimer=s disease, and others. I will argue that such research is 
generally ethically unproblematic.2
Initial Assumptions 
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 I will begin with several assumptions that certainly will not be accepted by everyone. The 
first is that, subject to certain reasonable constraints, it is ethically acceptable to perform similar 
research on normal animals. I am well aware that there are vociferous critics of research using 
animals in such ways. Perhaps those critics are correct, but I will assume here that they are not so 
as to isolate as much as possible a narrower moral issue. The second assumption I will make is 
that it would not be ethically troubling to create chimeras using non-human species. For 
example, if a mouse were created with bovine brain cells, this would not raise significant ethical 
red flags. It is only when human cells are involved that serious ethical worries are raised. This 
assumption, too, could, and perhaps should, be very easily rejected. Perhaps there could be 
environmentally disastrous consequences should such chimeras be released or escape into the 
wild. Or perhaps such a chimera might suffer from resultant abnormalities that would make its 
life miserable. Again, I will discount such worries for present purposes in order to target the 
specific question of whether there are legitimate moral concerns resulting from the crossing of 
boundaries between humans and other species. One more assumption that I need to make is that 
there is nothing problematic about using human stem cells in general. That is, I will assume that 
there are ethically acceptable ways of obtaining human stem cells (or, perhaps, if only they will 
do, human embryonic stem cells), so that the only questions to be considered, ethically speaking, 
concern how they may be used, and not whether they may be used at all. 
 The core ethical issue, then, concerns the moral significance of chimeras with human 
brain cells (hereafter Abrain chimeras@). Since the moral significance of a thing  is a function of 
what morally significant properties it has, the permissibility of research on brain chimeras stands 
or falls on the question of whether brain chimeras have more morally significant properties (or 
have them to a greater degree) than non-chimeric animals. 
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The Argument 
 The basic argument that I take to show the moral innocence of creating brain chimeras is 
this: 
 1. The creation of brain chimeras is morally objectionable only if there is good reason to 
think that brain chimeras would have greater moral significance than non-chimeric non-human 
animals, or there is good reason to think that the creation of brain chimeras would lead to 
morally bad consequences. 
 2. There is no good reason to think that brain chimeras would have greater moral 
significance than non-chimeric non-human animals. 
 3. There is no good reason to think that the creation of brain chimeras would lead to 
morally bad consequences. 
 4. Therefore, the creation of brain chimeras is morally unobjectionable. 
 In what follows, I will consider objections to each of the premises, and argue that those 
objections are not compelling.
The First Premise 
 It is important to consider the first premise in light of the assumptions I have made at the 
outset. Once those assumptions have been granted, the only reasons to think there would be 
anything objectionable about creating brain chimeras would be in respect of their intrinsic moral 
properties, or in terms of morally relevant consequences. One possible objection to this might 
appeal to the possibility that brain chimeras might have less moral significance than non-
chimeric animals. Perhaps brain chimeras would be defective in some way that impairs their 
moral significance, and one might wonder whether this is permissible. For example, it seems to 
be morally wrong deliberately to attempt to conceive a human child who would be born with 
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severe mental retardation. Could it not also be similarly wrong to breed a defective chimeric 
animal? 
But I have been assuming that there is nothing morally objectionable, in general, about 
research performed on non-chimeric animals. If it would not be morally objectionable 
deliberately to breed a mouse with certain qualitative flaws that would confer upon it less moral 
significance than a normal mouse, then there will, likewise, be nothing objectionable about 
creating a brain chimera that would have comparably diminished moral significance. At best, one 
might be able to argue that creating some chimeric animals is wrong in the same ways and for 
the same reasons as comparable research involving non-chimeric animals.
A more serious objection is that the first premise puts entirely too much weight on 
consequences. My reply to this is to suggest that any plausible non-consequentialist moral 
principle that would show the creation of brain chimeras to be problematic would have to appeal 
to the morally significant properties of affected individuals. If this is right, then the first part of 
the consequent will handle any problematic cases that can=t be evaluated in terms of morally bad 
consequences. 
The Second Premise
 Much of the concern about brain chimeras derives from imagining them to be cognitively 
human-like. A mouse with human brain cells might exhibit cognitive and behavioral traits that 
are more human-like than mouse-like, similar to the fictional character AStuart Little@.3 It is not 
clear exactly what is problematic about this scenario. Is it the actual creation of such a creature 
that would be problematic? Or do moral problems arise only with respect to how such a creature 
would be treated? It is difficult to see how the former claim could be defended if the mouse were 
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treated in, say, the manner the character Stuart Little is treated. Suppose that E.B. White=s story, 
Stuart Little, had been a documentary rather than a fictional tale. Suppose, further, that Stuart 
was a brain chimera. Would it be appropriate to track down the researchers that had created 
Stuart and accuse them of having committed an egregious moral offense of some kind? Certainly 
Stuart, himself, would not think so B no more than human beings conceived through in vitro 
fertilization would have reason to lodge protests over the manner of their origination. It must be, 
then, that concerns over brain chimeras exhibiting human-like cognitive and behavioral traits 
pertain to the way such creatures might be treated. In other words, the concern is that their moral 
significance would not be appropriately respected. If, as I have assumed at the outset, there is 
nothing especially objectionable about the ways non-chimeric animals are treated, there will only 
be reasons to object to the treatment of chimeric animals if they should have morally significant 
properties that non-chimeric animals lack. 
The Soul of a Chimera 
Error! Bookmark not defined. Although very few in the scientific community have 
serious concerns about whether or not research negatively impacts human souls, the same cannot 
be said regarding the general public. Perhaps a majority of North Americans believe that human 
beings possess an immortal soul that is crucially involved in conferring on human beings their 
moral significance. Many of the individuals who are empowered to make policy decisions most 
likely hold such a view. Accordingly, even if the view is false, it remains worthwhile to consider 
whether such a view is inconsistent with the creation of brain chimeras and relevantly similar 
research projects. 
There are two reasons why the creation of brain chimeras should not worry those who 
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think human moral significance is tied to the possession of a soul. 
The first reason is based on the putatively theological origins of souls. Most who believe 
in souls also believe they are conferred on human organisms by God. But God would have no 
good reason to confer a human soul on a brain chimera. Therefore, there is no reason to think 
that brain chimeras have any greater moral significance than normal animals. 
The second reason is that it is increasingly apparent that even if a dualistic account of 
mind should turn out to be correct where not all human cognitive properties can be reduced to or 
explained in terms of neurophysiology, the vast majority of them can be. In particular, the 
ethically significant properties of humans that are at the center of most moral concerns are 
clearly grounded in human neurophysiology. Therefore, even if one believes that souls exist, the 
creation of brain chimeras will only be ethically troubling if there are good reasons to think that 
they would, in any significant way, have the sort of neurophysiological properties that are linked 
to moral significance in ways that are lacking in normal animals. I will argue below that there are 
no good reasons for thinking this to be the case. 
Wonder tissue 
Error! Bookmark not defined. If humans have greater moral significance than 
other animals, it is plausible to hold that this heightened moral significance is due to the morally 
significant properties that the human brain makes possible. One concern that many people may 
have in response to the possibility of creating brain chimeras is that the brain chimeras might, in 
virtue of having human brain tissue, also exhibit some of the same morally significant properties 
that normal humans exhibit. There is little reason to think that this would be the case, however. 
There is nothing morally special, from a biological point of view, about human brain 
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cells. A single human brain cell, or for that matter even a fairly large cluster of such cells, 
existing in functional isolation from the rest of a human brain, is as much devoid of moral 
significance as would be a cluster of brain cells from any other sort of creature. To treat human 
brain cells as though they would somehow confer upon brain chimeras a full complement of 
human cognitive traits is to treat human brain cells as though they constituted a sort of what 
Daniel Dennett has called Awonder tissue@.4 
Suppose a researcher were to cultivate a colony of human brain cells and attempted to get 
them to grow in a particular configuration. This could have potentially valuable applications. 
Suppose the researcher decided to attempt to grow the cells in a pattern resembling a >+= sign. It 
would be a poor objection to this research project that the configuration of brain cells might 
possess human-like cognitive properties that were morally significant. There is no reason at all to 
suppose that the >+= -shaped configuration of cells would have any such properties merely 
because they were human brain cells. Human brain cells are not wonder tissue. Whatever 
morally significant properties humans have as a result of their brains is not simply a result of the 
peculiar biology of human brain cells. Rather, it is the functional organization of human brain 
cells that makes the difference. So far, the evidence suggests that in creating brain chimeras, 
human brain cells are adapted into the patterns of functional organization that would be expected 
not of humans, but of mice (and we would expect similar results in other species).5
 Having said this, however, I do think it would be problematic to create a chimera with 
non-human brain cells but human functional organization. This is not because there is any good 
reason to think that such a creature would be morally less significant in light of the genetic 
properties of the cells, but rather because there is some reason to worry that such a chimera 
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would not develop normally. I do not think that this implies that there is serious reason to think 
that non-human animals with human brain cells might also fail to develop normally, only in 
ways that would confer upon them enhanced moral significance. There are probably too many 
factors that would prevent such brain chimeras from developing the kinds of cognitive traits that 
would raise moral concerns. 
Playing God 
 Another popular complaint is that researchers who create brain chimeras is a case of 
Aplaying God@ . This is not really an objection, however, since use of the expression APlaying 
God@ clearly shows that it functions entirely as a way of suggesting that someone is doing 
something that only God should do. It amounts, therefore, to mere assertion. To say that the 
creation of brain chimeras is playing God is nothing more than to say that researchers are doing 
something that only God should do. No argument is offered as to why only God should be doing 
it. There is no real objection here B only an expression of moral discomfort without explanation. 
Of course, it is possible that one could try to mount a more complex argument here by 
appealing to a general principle to the effect that humans ought never to interfere with the 
workings of nature, or perhaps of biological nature, in particular. There is little plausibility in 
this, however, as it would clearly rule out as illegitimate all sorts of medical and scientific 
progress that involves doing exactly that. 
 A still more sophisticated objection would involve attributing to nature a divinely-
instituted teleology. Biological nature has, on this view, an inherent teleology with which it is 
wrong to interfere. According to this view, to Aplay God@ is to perform actions that go against 
the natural order that has been divinely established.6
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There are two primary replies to this argument from natural teleology. The first is to 
argue that it would rule out too many forms of behavior that do not seem at all morally 
problematic. For example, one might argue that it appears inconsistent with natural teleology to 
build machines that allow humans to fly, to administer an anticoagulant, or to attempt to preserve 
an endangered species by isolating it from its natural predators. Humans routinely perform many 
actions that would appear to be at odds with natural teleology. A response to this might be to 
attempt to hold that promoting the good of humanity by a variety of artificial measures is, in fact, 
consistent with natural teleology. But if one takes this route, it is difficult to see why the 
administration of an anticoagulant is morally acceptable but the creation of brain chimeras is not, 
if the latter activity should turn out to contribute to promoting the good of humanity. 
 A second response to arguments from natural teleology is simply to argue that such 
views have been supplanted by an evolutionary naturalism according to which things in nature 
do not aim at any divinely ordained patterns. Moral value is not something that is built into the 
natural order by God, but rather is brought to it by us. This is a more difficult approach to 
defend, since it depends on a defense of a thoroughly naturalistic world view. Nevertheless, I 
believe there are good reasons to think that this is, in fact, the correct view. However, it is too 
ambitious a project to offer a defense of this point here. Furthermore, a defense of creating brain 
chimeras that relies on a thoroughly naturalistic world view is not likely to find many in the 
general public, or among policy makers, who would receive it well. It would, therefore, be more 
strategically prudent to produce a defense that is at least neutral with respect to the naturalistic 
hypothesis. 
The Third Premise - Consequences 
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 Still another line of argument against the creation of brain chimeras is that allowing such 
research to go forward opens the door for other research that would be more clearly troubling. 
For example, a brain chimera in which non-human embryonic stem cells were used to create a 
human whose brain consisted of non-human brain cells appears to be ethically troubling. Such a 
brain chimera would most likely exhibit the sort of functional organization that would give rise 
to the right sort of morally significant cognitive properties that we should worry about. Still 
another problematic case might be the creation of whole-creature human-non-human chimeras, 
such as, for example, a human-chimpanzee chimera. We can call this kind of scenario the 
Ahumanzee@ scenario.7
However troubling the humanzee scenario might be, I do not think it affects the question 
of whether or not the creation of brain chimeras is, in general, ethically problematic. In the first 
place, concerns that humanzee-type scenarios might come about can already be raised by the fact 
that cross-species chimeras have in fact been created.8 More importantly, however, it seems a 
poor rule that an ethically acceptable action should be prohibited because it might lead to an 
ethically unacceptable action. It has to be the case that it is at least highly likely that the 
acceptable action will lead to the unacceptable action for this sort of slippery slope argument to 
have any plausibility. However, there is no good reason at all to think that the creation of brain 
chimeras is any more likely to lead to humanzee-type scenarios that is any of the many other 
genetic manipulation techniques that are already in use. 
 Another objection is that the creation of some chimeras, perhaps especially certain kinds 
of brain chimeras, might lead to beings possessing indeterminate moral status. Such an objection 
has been raised by Richard Doerflinger, who opined, “I think it would be basically immoral to 
  11 
Between the Species VII August 2007 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 
create a human whose status we could not determine. We=d have an unresolvable moral 
dilemma about how to treat this animal.”9 One problem with Doerflinger=s objection is that 
there are already creatures whose moral status is difficult to determine. This is one of the factors 
that generates so much disagreement over abortion, euthanasia. While some people see early 
embryos as nearly devoid of moral significance,10 others see them as having the same  moral 
status as normal adults.11 Similar apparently intractable disagreements exist regarding the moral 
status of humans in Persistent Vegetative States, and regarding the moral status of non-human 
animals. I suggest that although the creation of some kinds of chimeras may generate new cases 
over which moral disagreement will surely exist, this does not constitute reason to prohibit the 
creation of all chimeras. In the first place, there are some chimeras whose moral status is 
certainly no more problematic than the breeding of normal animals B this is, I think, the case 
with brain chimeras exhibiting the sort of functional organization of brain cells typical for non-
chimeric animals of that type. In the second place, I think there is a compelling argument for the 
principle that holds that moral significance must be judged to be a function of morally significant 
properties, and this strongly suggests, I think, that some of the apparently intractable 
disagreements over moral status are in fact resolvable in principle. Such resolution would, of 
course, require significant revision or abandonment of many traditional ethical beliefs, but I see 
this as positive moral progress.12 It is progress, for instance, to abandon a belief in fixed 
biological species and the often attendant belief that only members of the species homo sapiens 
possess moral significance. Recognizing that moral significance is a function not of species 
membership, but of morally significant properties dissolves many otherwise troubling moral 
questions, though, admittedly, it creates others. Even so, it is better to have to resolve moral 
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problems that stem from a correct moral perspective than an incorrect one. 
This perspective also provides a response to the claim by Jason Scott Robert and 
Francoise Baylis that: 
All things considered, the engineering of creatures that are part human and part 
nonhuman animal is objectionable because the existence of such beings would introduce 
inexorable moral confusion in our existing relationships with nonhuman animals and in 
our future relationships with part-human hybrids and chimeras.13
First off, it isn't clear that the confusion such cases would introduce is, in all cases, necessarily 
inexorable. Furthermore, even if it is true that some action type generates moral confusion, that 
doesn't necessarily mean that it is immoral to perform actions of that type. We cannot plausibly 
endorse a general rule that says that an action is wrong wherever performing it would generate 
moral confusion (or even inexorable moral confusion). For example, many medical technologies 
make it possible to keep people alive who previously would have died. In many cases, the 
availability of these technologies creates significant moral confusion regarding their use or their 
discontinuation. Few people, however, would accept that such confusion constitutes good 
reasons not to develop or employ these technologies in at least some cases. 
 The creation of chimeras having human brain cells is no more ethically troubling than is 
research involving non-chimeric animals of the relevant type, since there is no compelling reason 
for thinking that such animals would possess any greater moral significance than the non-
chimeric animals. It is a mistake to think that there is anything morally special about genetically 
human cells apart from the ways in which they can be functionally organized so as to ground 
morally significant properties of whole organisms. If research on the non-chimeric animals is 
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morally permissible, so, too, would be research using morally comparable chimeras. 
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